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Abstract 
How do private agents interpret central bank actions and communication? To what extent do 
the effects of monetary shocks depend on the information disclosed by the central bank? This 
paper investigates the effect of monetary shocks and shocks to the Bank of England’s 
inflation and output projections on the term structure of UK private inflation expectations, to 
shed light on private agents’ interpretation of central bank signals about policy and the 
macroeconomic outlook. We proceed in three steps. First, we correct our dependent variables 
– market-based inflation expectation measures – for potential risk, liquidity and inflation risk 
premia. Second, we extract exogenous shocks following Romer and Romer (2004)’s 
identification approach. Third, we estimate the linear and interacted effects of these shocks in 
an empirical framework derived from the information frictions literature. We find that 
private inflation expectations respond negatively to contractionary monetary policy shocks, 
consistent with the usual transmission mechanism. In contrast, we find that inflation 
expectations respond positively to positive central bank inflation or output projection 
shocks, suggesting private agents put more weight on the signal that they convey about 
future economic developments than about the policy outlook. However, when shocks to 
central bank inflation projections are interacted with shocks to output projections of the same 
sign, they have no effect on inflation expectations, suggesting that private agents understand 
the functioning of the central bank reaction function and put more weight on the policy 
signal when there is no trade-off. We also find that the effects of contractionary monetary 
shocks are amplified when they are accompanied by positive shocks to central bank inflation 
projections. The coordination of policy decisions and macroeconomic projections thus 
appears important for managing inflation expectations. 
 
Keywords: Monetary policy, information processing, signal extraction, market-based 
inflation expectations, central bank projections, real-time forecasts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Expectations matter in determining current and future macroeconomic outcomes. Hence, the 
management of private expectations has become a central feature of monetary policy 
(Woodford, 2005), as private agents’ interpretation of central bank decisions and 
communication is crucial in the formation of their beliefs. In a set-up with information 
frictions, both the central bank’s decisions and its economic projections can convey 
information about its view on both macroeconomic developments and about current and 
future policy developments. The former channel arises from the fact that private agents 
might have different information sets to the central bank. In that case, the central bank’s 
policy decisions and its communication about its view of macroeconomic developments can 
signal that information to private agents, influencing their beliefs about the economic 
outlook. We define this as a ‘macro outlook signal’. The latter channel stems from the central 
bank’s ability to affect real variables through the real interest rate because of nominal 
rigidities or information frictions. Because of this, a central bank’s policy decisions and 
projections for the economy can also provide private agents with information about the 
outlook for policy.  We define this as a ‘policy signal’.1 
 
Which channel – the macro outlook or policy signal – dominates matters, given that the 
transmission of monetary policy depends on how private agents interpret changes in the 
policy rate or in central bank projections. For instance, on the one hand, an increase in the 
policy rate could signal to private agents that an inflationary shock will hit the economy in 
the future, causing higher inflation. On the other hand, the same increase in the policy rate 
may be interpreted as a simple contractionary monetary shock, which will lead to lower 
inflation in the future. If the first interpretation is given more weight, then increasing the 
policy rate will lead to higher private inflation expectations, whereas if the second is, then 
tightening the policy rate will decrease private inflation expectations.2 Similarly, an increase 
in the central bank’s inflation projections could signal to private agents that an inflationary 
shock will hit the economy in the future, causing higher inflation; whereas the same increase 
in central bank inflation projections may be interpreted as a signal about a future policy 
tightening, which will lead to lower expected inflation. 
 
This paper assesses, for the United Kingdom (UK), whether and how the term structure of 
market-based inflation expectations responds to policy decisions and central bank 
macroeconomic projections, and so which signal dominates.3 If a positive signal about the 
macro outlook is taken from either a policy decision or a change in the central bank’s 
economic projections, inflation expectations will increase.  Whereas if either a higher policy 
setting or economic projections is taken to signal a future contractionary policy shock, 
inflation expectations will decrease. Hence, a policy signal being taken will have the opposite 
effect on inflation expectations to the circumstance in which a macro outlook signal is taken, 
and so the sign of the estimated effects of shocks to Bank Rate and the Bank of England 
                                                            
1 We use the term ‘policy signal’ for the classical monetary transmission channel and the term ‘macro outlook 
signal’ for what Melosi (2015), for instance, calls the ‘signaling channel of monetary policy’. That is because we 
study the information content of a central bank’s macroeconomic projections (as well as its policy decisions), so 
the usual terminology is not appropriate.    
2 The macro outlook signal of monetary policy shocks might then be one of the explanations for the positive 
response of inflation to monetary shocks documented in the VAR literature as the “price puzzle” (Sims 1992). 
Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) finds that including inflation expectations in VARs captures this price puzzle, so 
evidence supporting the possibility of an outlook signal would reconcile these contributions. 
3 We specifically focus on quantitative communication so as to abstract from quantification issues of other types 
of qualitative communication like statements, minutes and speeches (see Blinder et al. 2008 for a review). 
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(Bank hereafter)’s macroeconomic projections on private inflation expectations is indicative 
of the relative weight private agents put on each signal. We then investigate whether the 
publication of macroeconomic projections, by facilitating information processing, modifies 
private agents’ signal extraction from monetary shocks. 
 
The literature has focused, both theoretically and empirically, on the classical monetary 
policy transmission signal, while the macro signalling issue has received less attention – 
most of the analyses that do exist are theoretical in nature. For example, Morris and Shin 
(2002) show that public signals – for instance those from a central bank – affect private 
agents’ actions. And Angeletos et al. (2006) study the signalling effects of policy in a 
coordination game. Walsh (2007) studies optimal transparency when the central bank 
provides public information by setting its policy instrument. In Baeriswyl and Cornand 
(2010), the central bank instrument discloses information about policymakers’ assessment of 
shocks which are imperfectly observed by firms. Kohlhas (2014) shows how central bank 
information disclosure may increase the information content of public signals about the state 
of the economy. Tang (2014) builds a model in which policy actions can signal information 
about macro developments, because policymakers are more informed than private agents 
about exogenous shocks. Melosi (2015) develops a model in which the policy rate has 
signalling effects about the macro outlook because aggregate variables are not observed by 
individual firms. Nevertheless, none of these works investigates the signals that can be taken 
– about the policy and macro outlook – from central bank macroeconomic projections. This 
work is also related to the empirical finding documented by Romer and Romer (2000), 
Campbell et al. (2012), Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) that contractionary United States’ 
federal fund rate surprises can have, under certain conditions, positive effects on private 
inflation or output expectations.4 
 
The contribution of this paper is to bring the issue of the signals provided by monetary 
shocks to the data, and to extend the analysis to the signals provided by central bank 
macroeconomic projections. Facilitating private agents’ information processing has been put 
forward as one reason why central banks complement their actions with communication 
(Gürkaynak et al. 2005, and Reis 2013), and we aim to document this potential 
interdependence.  
 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we correct our dependent variables, UK 
market-based inflation expectation measures, for risk, liquidity and inflation risk premia 
following the methodology used by Gürkaynak et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Soderlind (2011). 
Second, we deal with the issue of endogeneity by extracting series of exogenous shocks to 
the Bank’s policy rate and inflation and output projections by removing their systematic 
component, following the identification methodology of Romer and Romer (2004) and 
applied to UK data by Cloyne and Huertgen (2014) to derive a narrative monetary policy 
shock series. In the potential presence of non-nested information sets, we augment the 
Romer and Romer (2004)’s approach so that exogenous shocks are not only orthogonal to the 
                                                            
4 This paper also refers to a large literature focusing on the expectation formation process departing from the full-
information rational expectation hypothesis, introducing information frictions to account for some empirical 
regularities about the persistence of private expectations (sticky information, noisy information or adaptive 
learning models, and classes of models with heterogeneity in beliefs or in loss functions) led by Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001), Bullard and Mitra (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims (2003), Orphanides and Williams 
(2005, 2007) and Branch (2004, 2007). Another strand of the literature tries to explain macroeconomic outcomes 
with expectations data (see e.g. Nunes 2010 and Adam and Padula 2011), while another strand focuses on the 
characteristics, responsiveness to news, dispersion or anchoring of expectations (see e.g. Gürkaynak et al. 2005, 
Swanson 2006, Capistran and Timmermann 2009, Crowe 2010, Gürkaynak et al. 2010a, Beechey et al. 2011, 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012, 2015, Dräger and Lamla 2013, Ehrmann 2014, Hubert 2014, 2015). 
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central bank’s information set but also to private agents’ information set: Blanchard et al. 
(2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2015) discuss how information frictions modify 
the econometric identification problem. Third, we estimate the individual and interacted 
effects of these exogenous shocks in a general empirical framework derived from the 
information frictions literature, controlling for private output and interest rate expectations 
and for inflation surprises.  
 
We find that private inflation expectations respond negatively to contractionary monetary 
shocks but positively to central bank inflation and output projections. The sign of the effect 
of the Bank’s projections on inflation expectations indicates that private agents take a greater 
signal about the macro outlook from those projections than they do about the outlook for 
policy. That provides tentative evidence of the existence of a macro outlook signalling 
channel, in contrast to the theoretical predictions of full information models. More generally, 
one interpretation is that when private agents face a signal extraction problem from one 
shock only, they rely on the underlying nature of the information disclosed by the central 
bank: a monetary shock primarily conveys a policy signal and a projection shock primarily 
conveys a macro signal. 
 
We find that a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation projections has no effect on private 
inflation expectations when interacted with a positive shock to the Bank’s output projections, 
even though both projections individually have a positive effect. That suggests that the 
weight put on the policy signal from each shock is increased when both occur together. That 
might suggest that private agents understand the trade-off inherent in a central bank’s 
reaction function, and so are able to anticipate the likely endogenous policy response when 
that trade-off does not occur. In contrast, when the shocks to inflation and output projections 
have opposite signs, a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation projections has a positive effect 
on private inflation expectations. That is consistent with the macro outlook signal 
dominating the policy signal because the policy response is less clear.  
 
Finally, we find that shocks to the Bank’s inflation projections affect the impact of monetary 
shocks on inflation expectations. A positive shock to Bank Rate – i.e. a contractionary 
monetary shock – has a more negative effect on inflation expectations when it is interacted 
with a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation projections, whereas it has no effect when it is 
interacted with a negative shock to the Bank’s inflation projections. This suggests that the 
policy signal taken from a monetary shock is given a stronger weight when the shock is 
corroborated by information about the central bank’s view of the macroeconomic outlook. 
The same is not true of shocks to the Bank’s output projections, although that might be 
consistent with the remit of an inflation targeting central bank.  
 
These results give policymakers some insights on how private agents interpret and respond 
to policy decisions and central bank information. The signals provided by central bank action 
and communication appear to be important for the management of private inflation 
expectations, and these findings suggest that the publication of macroeconomic projections 
helps private agents’ information processing.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and empirical 
framework, section 3 the data, section 4 the correction of our dependent variables for 
different premia, section 5 the first stage regression to extract exogenous shocks from our 
independent variables, and section 6 the estimates. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Framework 
 
This section sets out our approach. First, we use insights from the literature to derive 
predictions about how private inflation expectations might react to shocks to the monetary 
stance and the Bank’s inflation and output projections under different assumptions about 
private agents’ information sets. Second, we develop an empirical specification, based on 
assumptions about private agents’ inflation expectations formation process, which allows us 
to test which of those predictions appear to hold for UK data. 
 
2.1. Theoretical predictions 
 
First, we derive predictions for the expected effects of shocks to policy decisions and central 
bank macroeconomic projections on private inflation expectations based on a standard 
macroeconomic framework, assuming all agents have full information. We base those on the 
effects that result from a standard 3-equation New-Keynesian (NK) model à la Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1997), augmented with habits in consumption and a Calvo price-setting 
mechanism as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).  
 
In such a framework, contractionary monetary shocks have a negative effect on private 
inflation expectations, through the usual transmission channels. Moreover, positive shocks to 
the central bank’s projections also have a negative effect on private inflation expectations. 
That is because shocks to projections enter the Taylor rule and are interpreted only as signals 
about future policy reactions, and a higher inflation projection leads agents to anticipate 
higher nominal interest rates in future. In a framework with full information, monetary or 
projection shocks are perfectly observed and there is no room for signals about the 
macroeconomic outlook. So, in a model with nested information sets, we would predict that 
both contractionary shocks to Bank Rate and positive shocks to the Bank’s inflation or output 
projections would negatively affect private inflation expectations. Those predictions are 
shown in the first column of Table 1. 
 
Second, we derive predictions for the expected effects of the shocks under a framework in 
which private agents and the central bank have non-nested information sets. That 
assumption would be consistent with works by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015) and 
Andrade and Le Bihan (2013), which provide empirical evidence of rejection of full 
information models. In addition, recent works on rational expectation models with 
information frictions such as Woodford (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Sims (2003) 
have highlighted how departing from the assumption of full information can account for 
empirical patterns about expectations, as well as leading to policy recommendations 
different from those with full information.  
 
In such a situation, when the observed policy rate differs from private agents’ expectations, 
agents cannot infer whether the central bank has changed its own view of future inflation and 
output or whether there has been a monetary shock. Shocks to the policy rate may therefore 
convey signals about both future macroeconomic developments and the policy stance to 
private agents. In a similar fashion, shocks to the central bank’s macroeconomic projections 
can also convey information about both the macro outlook as well as the future policy stance. 
So, in a framework with non-nested information sets, private agents face a multidimensional 
signal processing problem: they could take either of two signals – one about macro 
developments and one about future policy – from one observable variable. Said differently, 
private agents can misperceive changes in policy or projections for a mix of shocks in the 
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economy, which gives room for macro or policy signals – as modelled by Melosi (2015) for 
policy decisions.5 
 
Those two signals would be expected to have different implications for private inflation 
expectations though. If either a higher policy setting or economic projections is taken to 
signal a future contractionary policy shock, inflation expectations will decrease. In that case, 
the policy signal dominates the macro outlook signal – as shown in the second column of 
Table 1. In contrast, if a strong positive signal about the macro outlook is taken from either a 
policy decision or a change in the central bank’s economic projections, inflation expectations 
will increase. In that case, the macro outlook signal outweighs the policy signal – as shown in 
the third column of Table 1.  
 
 
 
The rest of the paper aims to investigate which predictions the UK data appear to support. 
The simple sign-identification strategy outlined in Table 1 allows us to assess whether there 
is any evidence of a macro signal, and so to assess whether private agents and central banks 
do have non-nested information sets. It also allows us to infer the relative weight given to 
each signal based on the movement in private inflation expectations. 
 
2.2. Empirical strategy 
 
Two theoretical models with rational expectations and information frictions, in which private 
agents face limitations in the acquisition and processing of information, motivate our 
empirical setup. This subsection presents a simple and general inflation expectation 
formation process in which we are agnostic about whether information is imperfect or not 
and let the data speak. When departing from full information rational expectations, new 
information may be only partially absorbed over time by private agents for two reasons: 
either information is sticky or imperfect. 
 
In the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), private agents update  their 
information set infrequently as they face costs of absorbing and processing information. 
However, if private agents update their information set, they gain perfect information (PI). 
Similarly, Carroll (2003) suggests that professional forecasts – which are assumed to be 
updated every period – spread epidemiologically to other private agents. Both processes can 
be described by these equations respectively: 
 
ߨ௧,௛௉ி   = (1-μPI) ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி   + μPI ߨ௧,௛௉ூ              (1) 
ߨ௧,௛௉ி   = (1- μSPF) ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி   + μSPF ߨ௧,௛ௌ௉ி                (2) 
 
where ߨ௧,௛௉ி   is the private inflation expectation made in period t for horizon h, ߨ௧,௛௉ூ   the perfect 
information forecast, and ߨ௧,௛ௌ௉ி  the professional forecast. Private inflation expectations are 
                                                            
5 Developing a theoretical model in which policy actions signal central bank’s information about macroeconomic 
developments (as in Melosi 2015, or Tang 2014) is beyond the scope of this paper, which contribution is empirical.  
Policy signal > 
Macro signal
Macro signal > 
Policy signal
Monetary shock - - +
Projection shock - - +
Non-nested information setsNested 
information 
sets
Table 1 - Expected sign of the response of inflation expectations
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represented as a linear combination of lagged private expectations of agents who did not 
update their information set, and either a rational or boundedly rational forecast of the 
proportion μPI or μSPF of agents having updated their information set.  
 
In the noisy information models of Woodford (2001) and Sims (2003), private agents 
continuously update their information set but observe only noisy signals about the true state 
of the economy. Their observed inertial reaction arises from the inability to pay attention to 
all the information available. It is an optimal choice for private agents – internalizing their 
information processing capacity constraints – to remain inattentive to a part of the available 
information because incorporating all noisy signals is impossible (Moscarini 2004). In such a 
model, forecasts are formed via a Kalman filter and are a weighted average of agents’ prior 
beliefs and the new information received. They can be represented by: 
 
ߨ௧,௛௉ி   = (1-ξ) ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி  + ξ Πt                    (3) 
where ߨ௧,௛௉ி   is a weighted average of the past inflation expectations (ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி ) and of new 
information about future inflation summarized by the vector Πt. When the signal perfectly 
reveals the true state, ξ=1; when it is noisy, ξ<1. Another interpretation of this reduced-form 
equation is that private agents have an initial belief about future inflation (their past inflation 
expectations) at the beginning of each period, and during each period, they incorporate 
relevant - but potentially noisy - information about future inflation.  
 
We can bridge the two different strands of the literature in a simple and general equation by 
modelling private inflation forecasts as a linear combination of past inflation forecasts ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி   
and a vector Λt, which captures new information between t-1 and t. To do that, we explicitly 
assume private agents have homogeneous inflation forecasts in the case of sticky information 
models, which allows us to match the point forecasts nature of the data used hereafter:6 
 
ߨ௧,௛௉ி   = β0 + β1 ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி  + βΛ Λt + εt               (4) 
 
The value of the β1 parameter, which we expect to be positive and significant, should shed 
light on whether the limited adjustment mechanism in which information is only partially 
absorbed over time is at work in data. The vector Λt includes the exogenous components of 
Bank Rate, the Bank’s inflation and output projections, as well as two additional vectors.7 
The first one Xt comprises the change between t-1 and t in private output forecasts, to control 
for their link with private inflation forecasts as evidenced by Fendel et al. (2011), Dräger et al. 
(2015) and Paloviita and Viren (2013). It also includes the change between t-1 and t in private 
interest rate forecasts orthogonal to Bank Rate. That allows us to control for the part of 
interest rate expectations which is unrelated to Bank Rate, to isolate the effect of policy 
decisions from the effect of changes in beliefs about the transmission mechanism. Xt includes 
a news variable capturing the set of macroeconomic data released between t-1 and t based on 
the announcement literature (see Andersen et al., 2003). The second vector, Zt, includes 
macroeconomic variables that are likely to affect future inflation and therefore to be used by 
private forecasters to predict future inflation: CPI, industrial production, oil prices, sterling 
                                                            
6 We acknowledge that point forecasts may suffer an aggregation bias because agents may have heterogeneous 
beliefs due to differences in their own information sets, but we abstract from this issue in this paper. 
7 For simplicity, we hereafter consider output growth forecasts, as available from the Bank of England or surveys, 
rather than output gap forecasts. 
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effective exchange rate, net lending, housing prices, the FTSE index and a dummy for 
Forward Guidance.8 Thus, equation (4) can be written as: 
 
ߨ௧,௛௉ி   = β0 + β1 ߨ௧ିଵ,௛௉ி   + β2 ߝ௧௜  + β3  ߝ௧గಳ೚ಶ  + β4 ߝ௧௫ಳ೚ಶ  + βX Xt + βZ Zt + εt             (5) 
 
where ߝ௧௜ , ߝ௧గಳ೚ಶ  and ߝ௧௫ಳ೚ಶ  are the monetary and projection shocks that we explicitly 
incorporate in private agents’ forecasting function. This specification can be interpreted 
through the lens of either noisy information models or augmented sticky-information 
models where rational or professional forecasts are substituted with monetary and projection 
shocks and additional control variables.  
 
The timing of policy decisions and Bank projection releases – made public at the beginning of 
the relevant months – should ensure that their information content is not already contained 
in private inflation expectations and that inflation expectation dynamics are not responsible 
for shocks. We test the robustness of this assumption by considering only the last daily 
observation of each month for our left-hand side variable so as to remove any potential 
endogeneity issue.  
 
After having corrected our dependent variables for potential risk, liquidity and inflation risk 
premia, and extracted exogenous shocks from our three variables of interest, we estimate 
equation (5) with OLS for the term structure of inflation expectations.9  
 
The sign of the β2-β4 parameters should shed light on whether monetary and projection 
shocks convey a macro signal: if that dominates, the parameters will be positive effect; if the 
policy signal does, they will be negative. Later, we introduce interaction terms between these 
shocks to assess whether the effects of a given shock change when they combine with 
another shock. 
 
3. Data 
 
Our dependent variable, πPF, is derived from inflation swaps. These instruments are financial 
market contracts to transfer inflation risk from one counterparty to another.  In the UK, they 
are linked to the Retail Price Index (RPI) measure of inflation, rather than Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), which is the measure the Bank’s inflation target is currently based on. In 
general, the advantage of financial market expectations over survey measures of expectations 
is that they are directly related to payoff decisions, so there is no strategic response bias or no 
difference between stated and actual beliefs. Although one disadvantage is that financial 
market expectations do not provide a direct measure of inflation expectations as they are 
affected by credit risk, liquidity and inflation risk premia. Swaps tend to be a better market 
measure for deriving inflation expectations than index-linked gilts because they are 
generally less sensitive to liquidity and risk premia.  
 
                                                            
8 The Monetary Policy Committee has provided guidance on the setting of future monetary policy since 7 August 
2013. For details, see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/forwardguidance.aspx. 
9 Estimating the equation along the term structure allows us to assess whether shocks have different effects at 
different horizons. Shocks’ signalling content (macro or policy) may vary with horizons for a number of reasons. 
One might relate to lags in the transmission of policy.  For example, the term structure could be thought of as 
being split into three groups: (i) the short term (i.e. 1 year ahead), which, given the lags associated with the 
transmission of monetary policy, should be unaffected by changes in Bank Rate, (ii) the medium term (i.e. 2-4 
years ahead), when interest rates are generally thought to affect the economy, and (iii) the long term (i.e. ≥ 5 years 
ahead), when the impact of any monetary shocks should have died out. 
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Another advantage of market measures is that they are available at a high frequency and for 
all horizons from 1 to 10 years ahead. We use them at the monthly frequency by taking the 
average of all the working day observations in each month.10 These are available since 
October 2004, which determines the starting date of our sample. For robustness purposes, we 
also use survey data from Citigroup/YouGov and the Survey of External Forecasters. 
 
The Bank's policy interest rate, i, called Bank Rate, is the intended policy target rate, which 
previously was also referred to as Minimum Lending Rate, Repo Rate, or Official Bank Rate. 
We also focus on the Bank’s inflation and output projections, πBoE and xBoE respectively. They 
are available from the quarterly Inflation Report (IR) for each quarter up to three years 
ahead. They are released in February, May, August and November. Two sets of forecasts are 
published: one set is conditioned on a constant interest rate path which ex-post includes the 
effect of the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) most recent Bank Rate decision. The other 
set is conditioned on the path for Bank Rate implied by market interest rates just prior to the 
previous policy meeting. A crucial assumption to ensure identification is that forecasts do 
not already contain the effect of the policy decision (in other words, they are uncorrelated 
with Bank Rate) as if the forecasts included the effect of the policy change, the regression 
results would be biased. We therefore use the latter set of forecasts.  
 
The vector Xt includes private output forecasts obtained from Consensus Forecasts for 
horizons from 1 to 6 quarters ahead (monthly constant-interpolated from surveys in March, 
June, September and December) and from the Bank’s Survey of External Forecasters for 
horizons from 2 to 3 years ahead (monthly constant-interpolated from surveys in February, 
May, August and November). Private interest rate forecasts are 3-month market interest rate 
expectations derived from nominal government bonds 1 to 10 years ahead. The news 
variable πs represents inflation surprises: the information set of macroeconomic data released 
between t-1 and t having an impact on the inflation outcome. Following the announcement 
and news literature (Andersen et al., 2003, and references within), this variable is defined as 
the difference between the actual value of inflation in t and the private inflation forecast 
formed at date t-1 for the quarter t (πs = πt – Et-1πt). This is equivalent to the private inflation 
forecast error and captures the news published between the two dates. Bloomberg provides 
the market average expected one month ahead inflation outturn at a monthly frequency. 
 
The vector Zt comprises various macroeconomic controls that are likely to capture expected 
inflation dynamics: CPI inflation, industrial production, oil prices, net lending, the sterling 
ERI, housing prices, the FTSE index (all included as 12-month percentage changes), and a 
Forward Guidance dummy. Our overall sample period is 2004m10-2015m03. Data sources 
and descriptive statistics together with the correlation structure of our main variables of 
interest are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  
 
4. Correcting Market-based Expectation Measures 
 
We aim to derive more accurate estimates of market-based measures of inflation expectations 
by correcting inflation compensation, as measured by inflation swaps, for credit risk, 
liquidity and inflation risk premia. Market-based measures of inflation compensation are an 
                                                            
10 Since market-based inflation expectations are available at the daily frequency, the Bank’s macro projections and 
some of the private output forecasts at the quarterly frequency and most of the macroeconomic variables at the 
monthly frequency, we perform our empirical analysis at the monthly frequency. Given that we are primarily 
interested in the lower-frequency effects of these shocks on private inflation expectations, we chose not to 
perform event-study analysis at a daily frequency around policy decision and projections publication dates. 
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appropriate indicator of inflation expectations if investors are risk neutral and there is no 
liquidity premium. However, that is unlikely to be the case, and these premia might have 
sizable values and be time-varying. We use a model-free regression approach to correct our 
compensation measure, rather than a no arbitrage approach based on term-structure models. 
 
Gürkaynak et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Soderlind (2011) decompose inflation compensation – 
ߨ௧,௛஼ைெ௉ – obtained from financial market variables into: expected inflation, ߨ௧,௛௉ி  , a liquidity 
premium, ߮௧,௛௟ , that investors demand to encourage them to hold these assets when they are 
illiquid, and an inflation uncertainty premium, ߮௧,௛௜௥ , that compensates investors for bearing 
inflation risk. We also include a risk premium, ߮௧,௛௥௜௦௞, compensating investors for holding a 
risky asset.11 As done previously, assuming t is the time subscript and h is the horizon of 
inflation expectations, this breakdown can be written: 
 
ߨ௧,௛஼ைெ௉   =   ߨ௧,௛௉ி   +   ߮௧,௛௥௜௦௞ +  ߮௧,௛௟  +  ߮௧,௛௜௥        (6) 
 
We assume that inflation compensation is the sum of expected inflation and the different 
premia, and estimate a linear regression model of inflation compensation on proxy measures 
capturing the different premia. In the spirit of Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) who control 
for risk premium using bond ratings, the credit risk premium is proxied by the Libor-OIS 
spread and by the average of UK major banks’ CDS premia.  Those measures should capture 
the riskiness of holding financial instruments, especially during the global financial crisis. 
The liquidity premium is proxied by the FTSE Volatility index (the UK-equivalent of the 
VIX), following Gürkaynak et al. (2010b) and Soderlind (2011). 12  For the inflation risk 
premium, we use the implied volatility from swaptions – options on short-term interest rate 
swaps – maturing in 20 years which captures inflation uncertainty, following Soderlind 
(2011).13 This leads us to estimate the following equation: 
 
ߨ௧,௛஼ைெ௉   = ߙ	+ ߚ௛௦ spread + ߚ௛௖ௗ௦ cds + ߚ௛௙ ftsev + ߚ௛௜  impvol + ߝ௧,௛஼ைெ௉  (7) 
 
We estimate equation (7) using OLS. We use monthly observations – calculated simply as the 
average of daily observations. And we estimate it separately for each horizon of inflation 
compensation from 1 year ahead to 10 years ahead. The risk premium, the liquidity premium 
and the inflation risk premium – which is directly related to inflation uncertainty – should 
                                                            
11 The credit risk premium has been neglected in most of the literature so far for two reasons. First, most of the 
studies focus on US treasury bonds and TIPS, and therefore implicitly assume there is no credit risk, those bonds 
being considered as risk-free (see Gürkaynak et al. 2010b). Second, when considering swap contracts to derive 
inflation expectations, the collateral is supposed to remove any potential credit risk. However, in a post-Great 
Recession sample in which sovereign bonds have been shown to be not as risk-free as previously thought and 
collateral value may have changed rapidly, we explicitly assess whether proxies for credit risk correlate with 
supposedly risk-free inflation compensation rather than assuming ex ante the absence of a credit risk premium. 
12 An extension of this analysis would be to correct for the micro liquidity premium affecting investors’ appetite 
for inflation hedging instruments compared to nominal instruments and for the maturity-specific liquidity 
premium affecting investors’ appetite for each maturity differently. One way to proceed to do so would be to use 
the residuals from a fitted term structure model as a proxy for liquidity (Garcia and Fontaine 2009, Hu, Pan and 
Wang 2013) using maturity-specific residuals to capture maturity-specific liquidity premia and the average of all 
yield curve fitting errors for indexed bonds over the average of all yield curve fitting errors for nominal bonds to 
capture the micro liquidity premium.   
13 An alternative indicator that to measure inflation uncertainty more precisely would be the standard deviation 
of the probability density function of inflation options maturing in 10 years, which are available for the UK only 
since 2007. Over the same sample, the correlation between this measure and our proxy is 0.76. 
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push inflation compensation up.14 So we expect the coefficients on the LIBOR-OIS spread, 
CDS premia, the FTSE Volatility index (ftsev) and implied volatility (impvol) variables to be 
positive. We also expect the risk and inflation risk premia to increase with the maturity of the 
swap. Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients for each maturity of the term structure of 
inflation expectations.  
 
Using these estimated parameters, we adjust the inflation compensation series by subtracting 
the fitted values of the contributions of the risk, liquidity and inflation risk premia to obtain 
corrected inflation expectation series.15 The left-hand side column of Figure 1 shows the raw 
compensation series (in red) and the corrected expectations series (in blue), and the right-
hand side column shows the evolution of the estimated risk premium (in blue), the liquidity 
premium (in red) and the inflation risk premium (in green). While the risk proxies started to 
become non-null and positive in mid-2007, they had effects of different signs for short and 
long maturities during the financial turmoil of late 2008: they had a negative contribution to 
inflation compensation when financial stress was most acute after Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
for maturities under 6-years, pushing inflation compensation to negative values, whereas 
their effects remained positive for longer maturities. After this episode of severe financial 
stress, the risk premium had a positive contribution for all maturities of around 20-50 basis 
points. The liquidity premium spiked at almost 120 basis points for longer maturities in the 
second half of 2008 and remained elevated at around 40-50 basis points after that. The 
inflation risk premium has declined over time, particularly at longer maturities, and became 
negative during 2011 (moving from +20 basis points to -10 basis points), which might be 
associated with the implementation of QE. Overall, the correction results in flatter series for 
inflation expectations and in lower inflation expectations at the longer horizons for which the 
difference between the unadjusted and adjusted series is larger. 
 
Overall, for compensation measures ten-years ahead, we estimate that the total combined 
premium has averaged about 60 basis points since 2004, and has varied between around 30 
and 160 basis points. For comparison, D’Amico, Kim and Wei (2010) find that the liquidity 
premium on US TIPS has varied between 0 and 130 basis points. Gürkaynak et al. (2010) find 
that the liquidity premium has varied between 0 and 140 basis points.  Risa (2001) finds an 
inflation risk premium in the UK of around 170 basis points, and Joyce et al. (2010) estimate 
it to be between 75 and 100 basis points. Ang et al. (2008) find an inflation risk premium of 
between 10 and 140 basis points in the US over the last two decades. Finally, using Gaussian 
affine dynamic term structure models, Guimarães (2012) finds a total combined premium of 
190 basis points over 1985-1992 and of 30 basis points over 1997-2002 for ten-year inflation 
compensation derived from UK gilts. 
 
5. Extracting Exogenous Shocks 
 
When estimating the effects of Bank Rate and the Bank’s inflation and output projections on 
private inflation expectations, we need to overcome one major econometric challenge. Our 
three variables of interest are likely to be endogenous to inflation expectations. To correct for 
this, we extract series of exogenous shocks by removing the systematic component in each 
original series, or said differently, by removing the contribution of the most relevant 
                                                            
14 This is in contrast to inflation compensation derived from inflation indexed bonds, for which we would expect 
the liquidity proxy to have a negative coefficient, because they are generally less liquid than nominal bonds. 
15 The correlation between the original and corrected series is 0.74, 0.84, 0.94, 0.97, 0.91, 0.83, 0.76, 0.72, 0.70, 0.69 
for each maturity from 1-year to 10-years, respectively. We assess the robustness of our baseline results using the 
original market-based measures in table A.3. 
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endogenous factors that would underlie the evolution of these variables, in the spirit of 
Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification strategy. In order to cope with the potential 
presence of non-nested information sets, we augment Romer and Romer (2004)’s approach 
so that exogenous shocks are not only orthogonal to the central bank’s information set but 
also to private agents’ information set. We aim to remove the contribution of lagged macro 
and private forecasts (so that shocks can have contemporaneous effects on these) and the 
contribution of contemporaneous Bank variables (so as to remove the information of 
policymakers), but we do not necessarily aim at obtaining orthogonal shocks as through a 
Cholesky decomposition since we are also interested in the interacted effects of the Bank 
variables. The main advantage of this approach over a VAR framework is that the 
identification of shocks does not rely on the timing of the relative response of each of the 
three variables to the two others in recursive identifications.16 The advantage over an IV 
framework is that there is no obvious instrument for these variables. We thus perform a first-
stage regression to extract the unpredictable component of Y = { i, ߨBoE, xBoE } orthogonal to its 
systematic component using the following equation: 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ݂ሺΩ୲ሻ ൅	gሺΨ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߝ௧௒              (8) 
 
We assume that the systematic response of Yt is driven by the policymakers’ response to 
their information set Ωt and to lagged macro and private forecast data Ψt-1, where f(·) and g(·) 
are functions capturing the systematic reaction, and the error term ߝ௧௒ reflects unexpected 
shocks to the three variables. The policymakers’ information set Ωt comprises a lag of the 
dependent variable (or a lag of the change in the dependent variable for it, which arguably 
better captures the previous policy developments we aim at removing the contributions of), 
the contemporaneous value of the two other Bank variables (the first component of a 
Principal Component Analysis across all maturities in the case of the Bank’s inflation and 
output projections); and the contemporaneous value of the first component of a Principal 
Component Analysis of the 1 to 3-year maturities of the market interest rate curve used as 
conditioning path for the Bank's macroeconomic projections. 17 The vector of macro and 
private forecast data Ψt-1 includes a lag of the first component of private inflation 
expectations from 1- to 10-year-ahead, of private output forecasts, of private interest rate 
forecasts, a lag of the vector Zt of macroeconomic controls described in sections 2.2 and 3, 
and a dummy for when Bank Rate is at its effective lower bound. Table 3 shows the 
estimated parameters of equation (8), together with the properties and the correlation 
structure of shocks. Figure 2 plots the estimated shocks. 
 
The relative timing of the variables in equation (8) is driven by the implicit assumption that 
monetary and projection shocks can affect macroeconomic and private forecast variables 
contemporaneously (so those latter variables enter with a lag) and that monetary and 
                                                            
16 Estimating a VAR might also raise the issue of the number of degrees of freedom. 
17 We consider the first component from a standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the different forecast 
variables available at each date for different horizons so as not to include all horizons into the model and so avoid 
multicollinearity. Estimating a monetary shock, for instance, for each horizon of private and central bank 
forecasts would not make any economic sense. The first component intends to capture the forward-looking 
information set of forecasters for all horizons together rather than the one for a specific horizon only. The first 
component of private inflation expectations captures 76% of the common variance of the underlying series, while 
the one of the market curve used as conditioning path for the Bank’s macro projections captures 97% of the 
common variance. The PCA of private output growth forecasts does not include the 3-year-ahead horizon for 
which the sample period is much shorter (it starts in 2006m01) and would reduce the sample size of the whole 
analysis. The first components of the PCA of private output forecasts with and without this variable are 
correlated at 99% over the common sample, suggesting that this restriction would only affect marginally our 
results if it does so. 
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projection shocks are orthogonal to the policymakers’ information set (so central bank 
variables enter contemporaneously). It is important to stress that the three shocks are not 
perfectly orthogonal to each other by construction, but are orthogonal to the policy rate, to 
the Bank’s inflation and output projections and to the market interest rate curve used as the 
conditioning path for the Bank's macroeconomic projections. The remaining information 
beyond the policymakers’ information set and macro and private forecast variables and 
contained in these monetary and projection shocks, is interpreted in terms of policy and 
macro signals disclosed to the public. 
 
Because the Bank’s inflation and output projections are published quarterly, the estimation 
of equation (8) for these two variables is performed for the specific months when the Bank’s 
projections are released but without affecting the lag structure (for instance, the shock to 
February projections takes January values for the lagged variables). The estimated shocks 
therefore have non-zero values during the months when the Bank’s projections are published 
and zeros otherwise, which is consistent with the fact that no re-assessment or releases of the 
Bank’s projections happen during these months. A potential alternative would be to proceed 
to a constant-interpolation of the Bank projection shocks for the following two months 
during each quarter to fill these gaps as one could argue that the projections are still 
available during the following two months. We choose to focus on the most conservative 
choice and keep all zeros for the months with no Inflation Report.  
 
When extracting the exogenous components of our three variables of interest, the inclusion 
of both private and central bank forecasts in the regression model enables us to deal with 
three concerns. First, forecasts encompass rich information sets. Private agents and 
policymakers’ information sets include a large number of variables. Bernanke et al. (2005) 
show that a data-rich environment approach modifies the identification of monetary shocks. 
Forecasts work as a FAVAR model as they summarise a large variety of macroeconomic 
variables as well as their expected evolutions. Second, forecasts are real-time data. Private 
agents and policymakers base their decisions on their information set in real-time, not on ex-
post revised data. Orphanides (2001, 2003) show that Taylor rule-type reaction functions 
estimated on revised data produce different outcomes when using real-time data. Third, 
private agents and policymakers are mechanically incorporating information about the 
current state of the economy and anticipate future macroeconomic conditions in their 
forecasts and we need to correct for their forward-looking information set when estimating 
the exogenous part of their respective forecasts. 
 
We assess the robustness of this methodology for extracting exogenous shocks in two ways. 
First, we show that our estimates of the effect of Bank Rate presented in section 6.1 are robust 
to three different monetary shock measures: one based on a shadow rate which includes an 
estimate of the effect of QE, one identified from a Taylor rule, and one reproduced from 
Cloyne and Hürtgen (2014). Second, if our estimated series of exogenous shocks are relevant, 
they should be unpredictable from movements in data. We assess the predictability of the 
estimated shock series with Granger-causality type tests. We regress our series on a set of 
macro variables appearing in a standard macro VAR and including inflation, industrial 
production, oil prices, the sterling effective exchange rate and net lending growth. The F-
stats in the bottom panel of Table 3 show that the null hypothesis that our estimated series of 
exogenous shocks are unpredictable cannot be rejected. It suggests that our shock series are 
relevant to be used in our second stage estimations to assess their effects on private inflation 
expectations. 
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6. The Response of Inflation Expectations 
 
6.1. The effect of monetary shocks 
 
We test our predictions by estimating equation (5) with OLS by looking at the conditional, 
but individual, effect of each shock. Our benchmark analysis is realised for central bank 
projections 4-quarters ahead. This horizon falls before interest rates are generally estimated 
to have their peak effect on inflation - around 18-24 months ahead - and therefore enables us 
to minimise the control issue,18  but should also convey information about inflation at the 1-
year horizon, the shortest horizon of the term structure of private inflation expectations 
studied here. Those results are shown in Table 4. The results show that β1 is positive, high 
and significant, consistent with inertia in inflation expectations, suggesting that the 
information frictions framework is likely to be appropriate for this analysis. 
 
Table 4 provides evidence that contractionary shocks to Bank Rate decrease private inflation 
expectations at all horizons from 2 to 8-years ahead – β2 is negative. That is consistent with 
contractionary policy shocks affecting private inflation expectations through the usual 
transmission mechanism channel and suggests that a policy signal is taken from monetary 
shocks. For horizons from 2 to 8-years ahead, shocks to Bank Rate account for 3 to 7% of the 
variance of inflation expectations.19 Except between the 1 and 2-year horizons, the magnitude 
of effect decreases with the horizon, consistent with waning effects of monetary policy on 
inflation, and is the most significant 3 to 6-years ahead. The transmission lags of monetary 
policy are often estimated to be around 18 to 24 months for inflation, according to Bernanke 
and Blinder 1992, or Bernanke and Mihov 1998, for example. Negative effects at horizons 
shorter and longer than the transmission lags could be interpreted as a policy signal effect 
going through the expectations channel.20 It is not clear whether there is any effect of a macro 
outlook signal, but even if it does have a non-null weight, there is no evidence that it 
outweighs the policy signal given the consistently negative response of private agents’ 
inflation expectations.  
 
This contrasts with one of the results of Melosi (2015) which finds that inflation expectations 
may respond positively to contractionary monetary shocks under certain calibrated 
parameters. If the quality of private information is poor relative to that of central bank 
information (private agents’ signal-to-noise ratio is low), and/or if the policy rate is more 
informative about non-monetary shocks than about monetary shocks (the variance of 
monetary shocks is low or the central bank’s estimates of inflation and the output gap are 
relatively accurate), then the macro outlook signalling channel may be at work. Similarly, 
Tang (2014) finds a positive effect when prior uncertainty about inflation is high.  
 
We can analyse whether there is any evidence that the relative weight put on policy and 
macro signals varies with the business cycle. The upper panel of Table 5 shows results when 
Bank Rate is interacted with a Hodrick-Prescott filtered measure of the output gap. A 
contractionary monetary shock has a more severe negative effect on inflation expectations 
during recessions, but a positive effect on inflation expectations at the 1 and 2-year horizons 
                                                            
18 The interest rate instrument gives the central bank some control over the forecasted variables, and this issue is 
circumvented when the horizon of forecasts is shorter than the transmission lag of monetary policy. 
19 We compute this variance decomposition using partial R² that indicates the fraction of the improvement in R² 
that is contributed by the excluded covariate. 
20 Fatum and Hutchison (1999) find no evidence in the United States supporting the policy signalling hypothesis 
that policy actions are related to changes in expectations about the stance of future monetary policy. However, 
their analysis focuses specifically on foreign exchange market interventions. 
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during booms. This result suggests that there might be some state dependence to the 
interpretations of contractionary monetary shocks: they might convey more of a macro 
outlook signal during booms (i.e. they signal inflationary pressures), but a policy signal 
during recessions. 
 
6.2. The effect of projection shocks 
 
We can also test whether the dominant signal that the Bank’s inflation and output projections 
convey is about the state of the economy or about the policy path. Table 4 suggests that 
positive shocks to the Bank’s inflation projections at 4 quarters ahead increase private 
inflation expectations 1 to 7 years ahead – β3 and β4 are positive. That effect is most 
significant 3 and 4-years ahead. On horizons from 1 to 7-years ahead, shocks to the Bank’s 
inflation projections account for 2 to 4% of the variance of inflation expectations. The sign of 
the effect suggests that the information conveyed about the macro outlook outweighs the 
policy signal conveyed by these projections. That is consistent with private agents and the 
central bank having non-nested information sets. The Bank’s inflation projections 8 quarters 
ahead also have a positive effect on inflation expectations between 4 and 9 years ahead 
(significant at the 10% level only), although those 12 quarters ahead have no effect (see lower 
panels of Table 4). The fact that shocks to the Bank’s short- and medium-term inflation 
projections affect private inflation expectations at medium- and long-term horizons suggests 
that private agents take a signal about the inflation outlook further ahead. However, the 
positive effect of the Bank’s inflation projections on inflation expectations decreases 
monotonically as the horizon increases.  
 
Shocks to the Bank’s output projections result in a different pattern. Projections 4 quarters 
ahead have a positive effect on private inflation expectations 2 to 4-years ahead and account 
for 3 to 4% of the variance, while those at 8 and 12 quarters ahead have a positive effect on 
inflation expectations 2 to 6 and 5 to 9-years ahead, respectively. This finding suggests that 
private agents also take a macro outlook signal from shocks to output projections, inferring 
that they imply increasing inflationary pressures – and that it dominates the policy signal. 
Two potential explanations of the long-run positive effect on inflation expectations may be 
that either private agents believe that the transmission of the shock from output to inflation 
takes time, or that the MPC would be less likely to fight output shocks than inflation shocks 
– consistent with the inflation targeting mandate – so that the effect of the former on inflation 
expectations are more pronounced than the latter on the long-end of the term structure. 
 
We can also assess whether the effects of the Bank’s inflation projections vary with the 
business cycle. The lower panel of Table 5 shows estimates of the interaction of the Bank’s 
inflation projections with a Hodrick-Prescott filtered measure of the output gap. Contrary to 
the equivalent interacted effect for Bank Rate, a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation 
projections has no effect during booms (which is also in contrast to the linear effect, which is 
positive) suggesting that private agents give more weight to the associated policy signal. In 
recessions, positive shocks have a more positive effect, suggesting that even more weight is 
placed on the macro outlook signal when the economy is weak. 
 
While the Bank’s inflation and output projections have positive effects on inflation 
expectations when each is considered in turn, we can also investigate what happens when 
they occur together. How private agents process that information might also be informative 
about whether they understand the mechanism of a central bank reaction function, as well as 
the role that central bank’s macroeconomic projections play in that function, and the trade-
off between inflation and output projections.  
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To do that, we compute interaction terms between shocks to the Bank’s inflation and output 
projections and introduce them into equation (5). Table 6 and Figure 3 show that when there 
is a positive shock to the Bank’s output projections, positive inflation projection shocks have 
no effect on inflation expectations, despite both projections individually having a positive 
effect. In contrast, when the projection shocks have the opposite signs – e.g. a positive 
inflation projection shock is accompanied by a negative output projection shock – the Bank’s 
inflation projections have a positive effect on private inflation expectations. One possible 
interpretation of these findings is that private agents understand the reaction function of 
policymakers and the trade-off contained within it. Hence, when the shock to both 
projections is of the same sign, there is no trade-off, and so the implied endogenous policy 
reaction is clearer, private agents downplay the macro outlook signal, and are able to 
anticipate the endogenous policy reaction consistent with these projections because the 
policy response is obvious. But when the shocks have different signs, and so the likely policy 
response is less clear, the macro outlook signal continues to dominate the policy signal.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that, in contrast to the theoretical predictions of full 
information models, there is some evidence that weight is placed on the signals about the 
macro outlook that projections contain. One interpretation of the results from this section in 
conjunction with those from 6.1 is that when private agents face a signal extraction problem 
from one shock only, they rely on the underlying nature of the information disclosed by the 
central bank: a monetary shock primarily conveys a policy signal and a projection shock 
primarily conveys a macro outlook signal.  
 
6.3. The interaction of monetary and projection shocks 
 
A further step is to investigate whether private agents process monetary shocks differently 
when they receive central bank information. Given that facilitating private agents’ 
information processing is one reason why central banks complement their actions with 
communication to the public (see, for instance, Adam, 2009, or Baeriswyl and Cornand, 
2010), it is possible that private agents’ interpretation of policy decisions could change when 
central bank macroeconomic projections are published at the same time. 
 
The Bank Rate shock series is reported at a monthly frequency, whereas shocks to the Bank’s 
projections can happen only in months in which the quarterly Inflation Report (IR) is 
published. In the months in which projections are published, the impact of monetary shocks 
might be different, because private agents are provided with more information. The upper 
panel of Table 7 shows estimates of the interaction of monetary shocks with a dummy for the 
Bank’s projections: contractionary Bank Rate shocks have a more negative effect on inflation 
expectations when they occur in months in which the IR is released. This suggests that the 
macroeconomic information conveyed during these months increases the weight placed on 
the policy signal of monetary shocks, relative to the macro outlook signal.  
 
The lower panel of Table 7 shows results when a dummy for positive and negative shocks to 
the Bank’s projections is included. Those show that a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation 
projections magnifies the negative effect of contractionary Bank Rate shocks on inflation 
expectations. And a negative shock to the Bank’s inflation projections reduces the negative 
effect of contractionary Bank Rate shocks. This suggests that the Bank’s inflation projections 
change the effect of monetary shocks. One possible interpretation is that the policy signal is 
given a stronger weight when policy decisions are corroborated by macroeconomic 
projections. 
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We then assess whether monetary shocks are given a different interpretation by private 
agents depending on continuous shocks to the Bank’s projections. The results above might 
suggest that when there is a positive projection shock, the effect of a contractionary Bank 
Rate shocks is more negative, as both shocks act to depress future inflation through a Taylor-
type rule. And we might expect a positive monetary shock to have a more muted effect when 
accompanied by a negative inflation projection shock, since those shocks have different 
implications when considered in a Taylor-type rule set-up. 
 
Table 8 and Figure 4 show that, for horizons from 1- to 6-years ahead, a positive shock to 
Bank Rate does have a more negative effect on inflation expectations when interacted with a 
positive shock to the Bank’s inflation projections than in the linear case. And that a monetary 
shock has no effect on expectations when interacted with a negative shock to the Bank’s 
inflation projections.21 That is consistent with the intuition outlined above, and suggests that 
the effect of monetary shocks can vary with the weight put on the policy signal.22 In turn, 
these findings suggest that the policy signal seems to be given a stronger weight when 
contractionary monetary shocks are corroborated by a positive shock to the Bank’s inflation 
projections, as the latter enters the Taylor-type rule and should trigger a response of nominal 
interest rates.  
 
This effect should not be confused with a business cycle effect. While both positive output 
gaps and positive shocks to inflation projections may be driven by a common unobservable 
process in the case of demand shocks, we have shown that the patterns when interacting 
each shock with Bank Rate are exactly the opposite. During the upswing of the business 
cycle, the weight put on the macro outlook signal increases, whereas higher central bank 
inflation projections reinforce the policy signal. This suggests that the information disclosed 
by the central bank is specific and processed differently by private agents. 
 
The lower panels of Table 8 show that when contractionary Bank Rate shocks are interacted 
with shocks to the Bank’s output projections, there is no non-linear effect and therefore that 
private agents do not appear to modify their interpretation of policy and macro signals 
according to this central bank information. It seems that private forecasters better 
understand the link between the policy instrument and inflation than with output, which is 
consistent with a central bank pursing an inflation targeting strategy. 
 
6.4. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We run several alternative tests to ensure the robustness of the baseline results. They are 
decomposed into tests about the left-hand side and right-hand side variables. First, we 
consider a more extreme information assumption, replacing the monthly average of all 
observations of market-based (daily) inflation expectations by the last observation of the 
month. While we discard all inflation expectation data points before the last observation by 
doing so, we ensure that: (i) all shocks or information happening during a month are 
                                                            
21 It is also interesting to note that a positive shock to Bank Rate interacted with a negative shock to the Bank’s 
inflation projections has a significant negative effect on the very long end of the term structure of inflation 
expectations. One possible interpretation of this finding might be that the central bank is perceived as extremely 
hawkish by private agents when doing so, so long-run private inflation expectations decrease. 
22 It is worth stressing that the weight given to a signal should not be confused with its sign of the shocks. It 
cannot be the macro signal that is given more weight, because when there is a positive projection shock, the 
macro signal is about higher inflation so the effect on inflation expectations should then be muted and when there 
is a negative projection shock, the macro signal is about lower inflation so the effect on inflation expectations 
should then be more negative. 
18 
 
available to private agents and potentially incorporated in the last observation of the month; 
and (ii) that there is no endogeneity issue between our left-hand side variable and its 
potential explanatory variables. Second, we replace the swap-based inflation expectation 
measures by the break-even inflation rates obtained from the difference between inflation-
indexed and nominal gilts. Third, we use raw inflation compensation rather than our derived 
inflation expectation measure, so as to observe the impact of the correction for the risk, 
liquidity, and inflation risk premia. Fourth, we replace the level of inflation expections by 
their first difference. Fifth, we replace the level of private expectations by their deviation 
from the Bank’s inflation target (corrected for the sample mean of the wedge between RPI 
and CPI).23 Sixth, we replace market-based inflation expectations by survey expectations 
from Citigroup/YouGov and the Survey of External Forecasters available at the monthly 
frequency for similar horizons, for which there is no need to correct for different premia. 
 
Seventh, we estimate equation (5) without the vectors Xt and Zt to examine potential over-
identification issues and further check the orthogonality condition of our estimated shocks. 
Eighth, we use a constant-interpolated measure of the projection shock, so the two months 
after the publication the Inflation Report take the value of the shock happening in the first 
month instead of zeros. Ninth, we assess the effects of big and small monetary shocks 
(greater and lesser than 25 basis points) so as to evaluate the impact of potential outliers. 
Tenth, we substitute our series of exogenous shocks to Bank Rate with three alternative 
measures of monetary shocks. First, because Bank Rate has been kept to its lower bound of 
0.5% since March 2009, we use a shadow rate measure that augments Bank Rate to include a 
Bank of England in-house estimate of the effect of QE.24 Second, we estimate a Taylor rule 
monetary shock, and third, we reproduce the measure of Cloyne and Hürtgen (2014) of UK 
monetary shocks.25 Finally, we estimate our benchmark equation until March 2009 only, 
when Bank Rate reached its lower bound, so as to check that our results are robust to the 
sub-sample when Bank Rate was considered the main policy instrument. 
 
All tests (Tables A3 to A6 in the Appendix) confirm the previous results, except for the test 
including survey measures of inflation expectations on which monetary shocks have no 
effect.26 One potential explanation for this finding may be that professional forecasters follow 
market expectations in the same way that Carroll (2003) finds that household expectations 
follow professional forecasters’ ones and therefore that the effect of monetary shocks is more 
                                                            
23 The wedge is computed as the difference between RPI and CPI inflation corrected for the contribution of a 
dummy capturing the uncertainty created by the announcement by the Office for National Statistics’ Consumer 
Prices Advisory Committee (CPAC) of a potential revision in the RPI calculation methodology, between May 
2012 and January 2013.  
24 The shadow rate is derived by computing a sequence of unanticipated monetary policy shocks to match the 
time series for the estimated effect of QE on GDP using estimates from Joyce, Tong, and Woods (2011) – see also 
Section 8.4 of Burgess et al. (2013). The underlying assumption that underpins this approach is that QE is a close 
substitute as a monetary policy instrument to Bank Rate such that the zero lower bound was not an effective 
constraint on monetary policy over the period in question. 
25 While we regress the level of Bank Rate on the previous change in Bank Rate, Cloyne and Hürtgen regress the 
change in Bank Rate on the level of past Bank Rate (together with the Bank’s projections and macro variables; 
equation (2) in their paper). Since the majority of macro models (including the one described in section 2) and 
conventional VARs introduce interest rates in levels, they cumulate their new monetary shock series afterwards. 
Their series stops in 2007 just before Bank Rate converged towards the effective lower bound. Using their 
methodology and the Bank of England’s shadow rate, we compute an equivalent to their monetary shock series. 
The shadow, Taylor rule and Cloyne-Huertgen monetary shock series have a correlation of 0.81, 0.10, and 0.27 
with our own monetary shock series. 
26 We also performed quantile regressions to assess whether estimates approximating the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable were similar across its entire distribution. Estimates of the conditional median or of other 
quantiles are similar to the OLS estimates. These outputs are available from the authors upon request. 
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diffuse. This raises a different issue, beyond the scope of this paper, about the transmission 
of monetary policy to the different agents populating the economy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the effect of shocks to the policy rate and to the Bank of England’s 
macroeconomic projections on private inflation expectations to shed light on the extent to 
which private agents take signals about the macroeconomic outlook and current and future 
policy developments from them. After having corrected our dependent variables, UK 
market-based inflation expectation measures, for potential risk, liquidity and inflation risk 
premia, and extracted exogenous shocks following Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification 
approach, we estimate the linear and interacted effects of these shocks in an empirical 
framework derived from the information frictions literature. We find that private inflation 
expectations respond negatively to contractionary monetary shocks, as would be expected 
given the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. However, we also find that inflation 
expectations increase in response to a positive shock to the central bank’s inflation and 
output projections, consistent with private agents putting more weight on the signal that 
they convey about future economic developments than the signal about the policy outlook, 
in contrast to the theoretical predictions of full information models. Although, while both 
positive shocks to the Bank’s inflation and output projections individually have a positive 
effect on inflation expectations, inflation projection shocks have no effect on private inflation 
expectations when they are interacted with a shock to the Bank’s output projections of the 
same sign. That result suggests that private forecasters do understand a central bank’s 
reaction function, but that they put more weight on the policy signal embodied in its 
projections when there is no trade-off between the shocks to inflation and output. Finally, we 
find that the effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock on inflation expectations 
increases when it occurs alongside a positive shock to inflation projections, and decreases 
when it is accompanied by a negative inflation projection shock. That is consistent with the 
policy signal being given a higher weight when policy decisions are corroborated by 
macroeconomic projections. That suggests that the publication of macroeconomic projections 
can facilitate private agents’ information processing, and so that the coordination of policy 
decisions and macroeconomic projections is important for the management of private 
inflation expectations. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
sw ap_1y sw ap_2y sw ap_3y sw ap_4y sw ap_5y sw ap_6y sw ap_7y sw ap_8y sw ap_9y sw ap_10y
LIBOR-OIS -0.881*** -0.412*** -0.263* -0.166 -0.096 -0.046 -0.011 0.014 0.029 0.038
[0.20] [0.15] [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13]
CDS 0.349*** 0.170*** 0.117** 0.095** 0.084* 0.076* 0.071 0.067 0.065 0.065
[0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
FTSE-Vol -0.021* -0.013 -0.004 0.004 0.011 0.017** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.030***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
ImpVol20 -0.030*** -0.014* -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.001
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 2.982*** 3.005*** 2.952*** 2.906*** 2.875*** 2.855*** 2.847*** 2.850*** 2.862*** 2.882***
[0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
R² 0.46 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.51 0.53
Table 2 - Regressing raw market-based measures on proxies for premia
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (13) for a different 
horizon and estimated w ith OLS.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bankrate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_cpi_8 BoE_cpi_12 BoE_gdp_4 BoE_gdp_8 BoE_gdp_12
L.ΔBankrate 0.668*** . . . . . .
[0.17]
L.BoE_cpi_h . 0.484** 0.253 -0.014 . . .
[0.20] [0.18] [0.17]
L.BoE_gdp_h . . . . 0.077 0.194 0.346**
[0.27] [0.18] [0.15]
Bankrate . 0.613 0.263 0.209 -0.951*** -0.559** -0.110
[0.40] [0.20] [0.13] [0.28] [0.23] [0.16]
PCA_BoE_cpi 0.043** . . . 0.053 -0.058 -0.039
[0.02] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03]
PCA_BoE_gdp -0.132*** 0.120 -0.008 0.037 . . .
[0.03] [0.12] [0.06] [0.04]
PCA_BoE_mc 0.420*** -0.980** -0.092 -0.059 1.090*** 0.629** 0.219
[0.07] [0.45] [0.22] [0.15] [0.30] [0.25] [0.17]
ZLB dummy -1.300*** 0.347 0.957*** 0.518** 0.126 -0.69 -0.051
[0.22] [0.66] [0.33] [0.22] [0.59] [0.46] [0.30]
L.PCA_PF_cpi 0.014 0.084* 0.013 -0.004 -0.045 -0.038 -0.01
[0.01] [0.05] [0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02]
L.PCA_PF_gdp -0.063* 0.144 0.041 0.047 -0.039 -0.043 -0.061
[0.04] [0.13] [0.07] [0.04] [0.13] [0.09] [0.06]
L.PCA_PF_ir3m -0.063*** 0.180 -0.035 -0.025 -0.175** -0.092 -0.016
[0.02] [0.12] [0.06] [0.04] [0.08] [0.07] [0.05]
Constant 2.622*** 1.048 0.432 1.383** 3.909*** 3.195*** 1.447**
[0.22] [1.13] [0.60] [0.50] [1.10] [0.89] [0.66]
Controls: Zt-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 42 42 42 42 42 42
R² 0.99 0.68 0.83 0.82 0.90 0.78 0.82
Mean SD Min Max AR(1) AR(3) SF-test pv al.
Bankrate 0.00 0.21 -0.72 0.63 0.44*** 0.16* 0.11
BoE_cpi_4 0.00 0.19 -0.88 0.63 0.00 -0.08 0.00
BoE_cpi_8 0.00 0.09 -0.37 0.45 0.00 0.06 0.00
BoE_cpi_12 0.00 0.06 -0.19 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.00
BoE_gdp_4 0.00 0.15 -0.45 0.69 0.00 0.07 0.00
BoE_gdp_8 0.00 0.12 -0.55 0.48 0.00 -0.12 0.00
BoE_gdp_12 0.00 0.08 -0.34 0.25 0.00 -0.06 0.00
Bankrate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_cpi_8 BoE_cpi_12 BoE_gdp_4 BoE_gdp_8 BoE_gdp_12
Bankrate 1
BoE_cpi_4 -0.10 1
BoE_cpi_8 -0.11 0.55 1
BoE_cpi_12 -0.05 0.14 0.76 1
BoE_gdp_4 0.17 0.01 0.10 0.12 1
BoE_gdp_8 0.16 -0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.55 1
BoE_gdp_12 0.08 -0.21 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.59 1
VAR(3) - F-stat 0.31 1.09 1.29 0.98 0.89 0.95 0.92
VAR(3) - p -v alue 0.99 0.37 0.22 0.48 0.58 0.52 0.54
VAR(6) - F-stat 0.49 0.79 1.16 1.09 1.30 0.69 0.99
VAR(6) - p-v alue 0.99 0.77 0.30 0.37 0.17 0.88 0.50
Table 3 - Extracting Exogenous Shocks
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. L is the lag operator. Each column corresponds to the 
OLS estimation of equation (14). The Z v ector of controls includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling
effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index and a dummy for Forw ard Guidance. The SF-
test is the Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data.
Predictability of exogenous shock series
Correlation of exogenous shock series
Properties of exogenous shock series
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PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate -0.179 -0.187** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.143*** -0.125*** -0.106** -0.088* -0.073 -0.061
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.224* 0.169* 0.149** 0.130** 0.111* 0.097* 0.089* 0.085 0.081 0.076
[0.13] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.150 0.195* 0.194** 0.160* 0.113 0.067 0.025 -0.014 -0.049 -0.079
[0.17] [0.12] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.666*** 0.733*** 0.776*** 0.796*** 0.804*** 0.803*** 0.796*** 0.784*** 0.771*** 0.758***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.916*** 0.713*** 0.593*** 0.545*** 0.534*** 0.547*** 0.579*** 0.623*** 0.671*** 0.718***
[0.24] [0.21] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
Bankrate 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
BoE_cpi_4 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
BoE_gdp_4 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
BoE_cpi_8 0.261 0.254 0.246 0.236* 0.223* 0.210* 0.200* 0.194* 0.192* 0.192
[0.28] [0.19] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12]
BoE_gdp_8 0.303 0.287** 0.265** 0.233** 0.194** 0.154* 0.115 0.078 0.043 0.013
[0.20] [0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
R² 0.62 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
BoE_cpi_12 -0.108 -0.093 -0.078 -0.046 -0.009 0.029 0.072 0.12 0.171 0.222
[0.49] [0.32] [0.27] [0.23] [0.20] [0.19] [0.19] [0.19] [0.20] [0.21]
BoE_gdp_12 0.133 0.154 0.189 0.213 0.230* 0.239* 0.242* 0.239* 0.231* 0.221
[0.33] [0.22] [0.18] [0.15] [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14]
R² 0.60 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.80
Table 4 - Benchmark estimates and other horizons
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to the OLS estimation of
equation (11) for a giv en horizon of priv ate inflation ex pectations. The tw o low er panels show s the parameters for BoE
projections only , but estimated w ith the model described by equation (11). Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in
priv ate output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow
betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling
effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index  and a dummy  for Forw ard Guidance.
4-quarter-ahead BoE projections
8-quarter-ahead BoE projections
12-quarter-ahead BoE projections
Partial R² - Variance decomposition
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PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate*Output Gap 0.235*** 0.165*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.061*** 0.047** 0.033* 0.022 0.013 0.009
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Bankrate -0.02 -0.085 -0.106* -0.109* -0.105** -0.098** -0.089* -0.078 -0.068 -0.058
[0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.221* 0.188** 0.165** 0.137** 0.114** 0.098* 0.090* 0.087 0.084 0.081
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.137 0.178* 0.171* 0.137* 0.093 0.052 0.015 -0.019 -0.05 -0.079
[0.15] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.790*** 0.853*** 0.850*** 0.844*** 0.837*** 0.823*** 0.804*** 0.783*** 0.765*** 0.750***
[0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.588** 0.393** 0.400** 0.418*** 0.445*** 0.491*** 0.553*** 0.620*** 0.681*** 0.733***
[0.23] [0.19] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.815 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
Bankrate coefficient w ith:
Positiv e OG 0.423*** 0.226** 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.15] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Negativ e OG -0.463*** -0.395*** -0.309*** -0.258*** -0.220*** -0.186*** -0.151*** -0.119** -0.093* -0.075
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
BoE_cpi*Output Gap -0.087 -0.082* -0.070* -0.056* -0.044 -0.032 -0.022 -0.013 -0.005 0.003
[0.06] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Bankrate -0.171 -0.189** -0.181*** -0.166*** -0.147*** -0.128*** -0.109** -0.091* -0.076 -0.064
[0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.172 0.127 0.118 0.106 0.094 0.086 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.081
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.061 0.119 0.131 0.109 0.075 0.039 0.006 -0.024 -0.051 -0.074
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.659*** 0.737*** 0.783*** 0.801*** 0.805*** 0.800*** 0.790*** 0.776*** 0.762*** 0.750***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.979*** 0.733*** 0.596*** 0.547*** 0.541*** 0.560*** 0.597*** 0.643*** 0.690*** 0.733***
[0.24] [0.20] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.64 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.805 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
BoE_cpi coefficient w ith:
Positiv e OG 0.009 -0.029 -0.014 0.000 0.012 0.025 0.040 0.058 0.074 0.087
[0.19] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Negativ e OG 0.335** 0.282*** 0.250*** 0.213*** 0.176** 0.147** 0.125* 0.107 0.091 0.075
[0.16] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Table 5 - State-dependence of monetary and projection shocks
Bankrate * Output Gap
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to the OLS estimation of equation (11)
for different horizons of priv ate inflation ex pectations. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output forecasts and in
priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases
related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the
FTSE index  and a dummy  for Forw ard Guidance. 
BoE_cpi * Output Gap
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
BoE_cpi * BoE_gdp -0.693 -0.772** -0.695** -0.564** -0.424* -0.283 -0.148 -0.023 0.089 0.183
[0.56] [0.38] [0.31] [0.27] [0.24] [0.23] [0.22] [0.22] [0.23] [0.24]
Bankrate -0.200* -0.209** -0.196*** -0.178*** -0.155*** -0.133*** -0.110** -0.089* -0.071 -0.056
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.141 0.08 0.07 0.065 0.062 0.064 0.072 0.082 0.091 0.099
[0.15] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.198 0.243** 0.234** 0.192** 0.137* 0.083 0.033 -0.013 -0.054 -0.089
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.688*** 0.766*** 0.806*** 0.821*** 0.823*** 0.816*** 0.802*** 0.785*** 0.767*** 0.751***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.839*** 0.607*** 0.496*** 0.466*** 0.474*** 0.507*** 0.559*** 0.620*** 0.683*** 0.741***
[0.25] [0.21] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
BoE_cpi coefficient w hen:
Δ+ BoE_gdp 0.040 -0.032 -0.031 -0.017 0.001 0.023 0.050 0.078 0.104 0.125
[0.20] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
Δ- BoE_gdp 0.241* 0.192** 0.171** 0.147** 0.123** 0.105* 0.093* 0.085 0.079 0.072
[0.13] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Table 6 - BoE inflation and output projections interacted together
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different
horizon, augmented w ith the relev ant interaction term and estimated w ith OLS. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in
priv ate output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow
betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e
ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index and a dummy for Forw ard Guidance. To facilitate the reading of the
interacted effects, w e compute the coefficient of one of the interacted v ariable w hile setting the v alue of the other v ariable at either
a high v alue (mean + 1 S.D.) or a low v alue (mean - 1 S.D.). We focus on these v alues w hen interpreting the results rather than
on the interaction term that giv es information w hen the interaction v ariables are at their av erage v alues, so zero in the case of the 
present shock v ariables.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate * Dummy -0.549* -0.365* -0.265* -0.200 -0.133 -0.062 0.013 0.088 0.157 0.212*
[0.28] [0.19] [0.16] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12]
Bankrate -0.066 -0.110 -0.122 -0.120* -0.115** -0.112** -0.109** -0.106** -0.105* -0.105*
[0.13] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_cpi_4 0.173 0.135 0.124 0.111* 0.098* 0.091* 0.090* 0.093* 0.096* 0.096*
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.258 0.265** 0.244** 0.198** 0.139* 0.079 0.022 -0.031 -0.08 -0.121
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.674*** 0.738*** 0.780*** 0.797*** 0.803*** 0.802*** 0.796*** 0.788*** 0.778*** 0.768***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.907*** 0.707*** 0.589*** 0.548*** 0.541*** 0.552*** 0.578*** 0.612*** 0.649*** 0.685***
[0.24] [0.20] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
Bankrate coefficient w hen:
Dummy  = 1 -0.615** -0.475*** -0.387*** -0.320*** -0.249** -0.174* -0.096 -0.018 0.052 0.107
[0.25] [0.17] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11]
Bankrate * Dummy -0.684*** -0.451*** -0.315** -0.225* -0.147 -0.075 -0.006 0.061 0.123 0.177*
[0.23] [0.16] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Bankrate -0.139 -0.158* -0.156** -0.146** -0.131** -0.116** -0.102** -0.089* -0.078 -0.072
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.218 0.141 0.124 0.1 0.08 0.069 0.065 0.067 0.073 0.082
[0.21] [0.15] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
BoE_gdp_4 0.109 0.174 0.179* 0.150* 0.108 0.066 0.028 -0.008 -0.04 -0.069
[0.16] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.664*** 0.743*** 0.788*** 0.805*** 0.809*** 0.805*** 0.795*** 0.781*** 0.767*** 0.754***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.863*** 0.649*** 0.535*** 0.504*** 0.510*** 0.539*** 0.584*** 0.638*** 0.693*** 0.744***
[0.24] [0.20] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
Bankrate coefficient w hen:
Dummy  = +1 -0.823*** -0.610*** -0.471*** -0.370*** -0.278** -0.191* -0.108 -0.028 0.044 0.106
[0.24] [0.17] [0.14] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11]
Dummy  = -1 0.545** 0.293 0.158 0.079 0.016 -0.041 -0.096 -0.150 -0.201* -0.249**
[0.28] [0.19] [0.16] [0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12]
Bankrate * Dummy for BoE's projections publication
Bankrate * Dummy for positive and negative BoE inflation projections
Table 7 - Interaction of Bankrate with BoE publication dummies
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different horizon,
augmented w ith the relev ant interaction term and estimated w ith OLS. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output
forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of macro
data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending,
Housing prices, the FTSE index and a dummy for Forw ard Guidance. To facilitate the reading of the interacted effects, w e compute
the coefficient of one of the interacted v ariable w hile setting the v alue of the other v ariable at either a high v alue (mean + 1 S.D.) or a
low v alue (mean - 1 S.D.). We focus on these v alues w hen interpreting the results rather than on the interaction term that giv es
information w hen the interaction v ariables are at their av erage v alues, so zero in the case of the present shock v ariables.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate * BoE_cpi -1.530* -1.258** -0.967* -0.668 -0.375 -0.11 0.125 0.334 0.519 0.680*
[0.87] [0.60] [0.50] [0.43] [0.39] [0.36] [0.35] [0.36] [0.36] [0.38]
Bankrate -0.16 -0.174** -0.168** -0.155*** -0.139*** -0.123** -0.107** -0.092* -0.079 -0.069
[0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.149 0.108 0.104 0.099 0.093 0.092 0.095* 0.101* 0.107* 0.111*
[0.14] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.103 0.161 0.167* 0.141* 0.102 0.064 0.028 -0.004 -0.033 -0.058
[0.17] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.661*** 0.741*** 0.789*** 0.807*** 0.811*** 0.805*** 0.794*** 0.779*** 0.763*** 0.749***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.929*** 0.691*** 0.557*** 0.515*** 0.516*** 0.542*** 0.585*** 0.638*** 0.692*** 0.743***
[0.24] [0.20] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
Bankrate coefficient w hen:
Δ+ BoE_cpi -0.444** -0.408*** -0.347*** -0.279*** -0.209** -0.144* -0.084 -0.030 0.017 0.057
[0.19] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Δ- BoE_cpi 0.124 0.059 0.012 -0.031 -0.069 -0.103 -0.131 -0.154* -0.176** -0.195**
[0.21] [0.14] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.09]
Bankrate * BoE_gdp -0.503 -0.103 -0.01 0.009 0.034 0.051 0.075 0.121 0.189 0.274
[1.02] [0.71] [0.59] [0.51] [0.45] [0.42] [0.41] [0.41] [0.42] [0.44]
Bankrate -0.179 -0.187** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.143*** -0.125*** -0.106** -0.089* -0.073 -0.062
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.216 0.168* 0.149** 0.130** 0.112* 0.098* 0.090* 0.086 0.083 0.08
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.132 0.192 0.193** 0.160* 0.114 0.069 0.027 -0.01 -0.042 -0.069
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.669*** 0.735*** 0.776*** 0.796*** 0.803*** 0.802*** 0.794*** 0.782*** 0.768*** 0.754***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.921*** 0.712*** 0.593*** 0.546*** 0.535*** 0.549*** 0.581*** 0.625*** 0.673*** 0.719***
[0.24] [0.21] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
Bankrate coefficient w hen:
Δ+ BoE_gdp -0.252 -0.202 -0.179* -0.161* -0.138* -0.117 -0.095 -0.071 -0.046 -0.022
[0.19] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08]
Δ- BoE_gdp -0.106 -0.173 -0.176 -0.163* -0.148* -0.132* -0.117 -0.106 -0.101 -0.101
[0.19] [0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Table 8 - Interaction of Bankrate with BoE inflation or output projections
Bankrate * BoE_cpi
Bankrate * BoE_gdp
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different horizon,
augmented w ith the relev ant interaction term and estimated w ith OLS. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output
forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of
macro data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net
lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index and a dummy for Forw ard Guidance. To facilitate the reading of the interacted effects, w e
compute the coefficient of one of the interacted v ariable w hile setting the v alue of the other v ariable at either a high v alue (mean + 1
S.D.) or a low v alue (mean - 1 S.D.). We focus on these v alues w hen interpreting the results rather than on the interaction term that
giv es information w hen the interaction v ariables are at their av erage v alues, so zero in the case of the present shock v ariables.
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Figure 1 - Raw and corrected inflation expectations (in %) and the three premia (in pp) 
   
Note: The first row is for 1-year ahead inflation expectations, the second for 2-year ahead, and so on. On 
the right panel, raw measures are in red and the corrected series in blue. On the left panel, the risk 
premium is in blue, the liquidity one in red and the inflation risk one in green. 
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Figure 2 – Exogenous shocks 
for Bank Rate, and the Bank of England’s inflation and output projections 
 
 
 
 
Note: The shocks plotted on these three panels are 
estimated from equations 15, 16, 17 respectively.  
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Figure 3 – Effect of the Bank’s inflation projections interacted with Bank’s output projections 
 
 
 
Note: Vertical bars indicate 1 S.E. confidence intervals. The red values correspond to the linear effect of the Bank’s 
inflation projections estimated in Table 4, while the black values correspond to the interaction effects estimated in 
Table 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Effect of Bank Rate interacted with the Bank’s inflation projections 
 
 
 
Note: Vertical bars indicate 1 S.E. confidence intervals. The red values correspond to the linear effect of Bank Rate 
estimated in Table 4, while the black values correspond to the interaction effects estimated in Table 8 upper panel. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
  
Variable Source Description
PF_h
Bloomberg and Bank of England 
calculations
Inflation ex pectation measures deriv ed from inflation sw aps. Instantaneous forw ard inflation 
rates for annual RPI inflation h y ears ahead. Monthly  av erage of daily  observ ations. 
Bankrate Bank of England Bank of England's policy  interest rate.
BoE_cpi_h Bank of England
Bank of England's modal projections for annual CPI inflation h quarters ahead, based on 
market interest rate ex pectations. 
BoE_gdp_h Bank of England
Bank of England's modal projections for annual GDP grow th h quarters ahead, based on 
market interest rate ex pectations. 
PF_gdp_h
Consensus Forecasts /   Surv ey  
of Ex ternal Forecasters
Consensus Forecasts' av erage projections for annual GDP grow th h quarters ahead, for h=1 
to 6. Surv ey  of Ex ternal Forecasters' av erage projections for annual GDP grow th h quarters 
ahead, for h=8 and 12. Monthly  constant interpolation from quarterly  frequency .
ir3m_h
Bloomberg and Bank of England 
calculations
3-Month market interest ex pectations deriv ed from nominal gov ernment bonds h y ears 
ahead. Monthly  av erage of daily  observ ations.
irchange Authors' computation
Dummy  that equals 1 w hen there is a change in Bankrate in a month in w hich the Inflation 
Report  is published.
mc_h Bank of England Market interest rate curv e used as conditioning path for BoE's macroeconomic projections.
PF-G_h
Bloomberg and Bank of England 
calculations
Breakev en inflation ex pectation measures deriv ed from nominal and index -linked 
gov ernment bonds.
Shadow  rate Bank of England calculations Bankrate adjusted for internal estimates of the impact of QE.
CITI_1y Citigroup/YouGov Citigroup/YouGov  measure of households' inflation ex pectations 1 y ear ahead.
SEF_2y Surv ey  of Ex ternal Forecasters
Surv ey  of Ex ternal Forecasters' measure of annual CPI inflation ex pectations 2 y ears 
ahead. Monthly  constant interpolation from quarterly  frequency .
SEF_3y Surv ey  of Ex ternal Forecasters
Surv ey  of Ex ternal Forecasters' measure of annual CPI inflation ex pectations 3 y ears 
ahead. Monthly  constant interpolation from quarterly  frequency .
CITI_5y 5 Citigroup/YouGov Citigroup/YouGov  measure of households' inflation ex pectations 5-10 y ears ahead.
RPI surprises ONS and Bloomberg
Difference betw een the outturn for annual RPI inflation in a giv en month and the market 
median forecast 1 month before.
CPI ONS Annual % change in the Consumer Price Index .
Indpro ONS Annual real Industrial Production grow th seasonally  adjusted. 
Oil FRED Crude oil spot prices, Brent - Europe. Annual % change.
Sterling Bank of England Effectiv e ex change rate index , January  2005 = 100. Annual % change.
Netlending Bank of England
12 month grow th rate of monetary  financial institutions' sterling net lending to priv ate non-
financial corporations (ex cluding the effects of securitisations and loan transfers) (SA).
Housing Halifax  and Nationw ide
Av erage of (SA) Halifax  and Nationw ide measures of av erage house prices.  Annual % 
change.
FTSE Bloomberg FTSE all-share index . Annual change.
FG Authors' computation Dummy  that equals 1 during the period for w hich Forw ard Guidance on policy  w as in place.
ZLB Authors' computation Dummy  that equals 1 during the period Bankrate is at its effectiv e low er bound of 0.5%.
LIBOR-OIS FRED and Thomson DataStream
3-Month London Interbank Offered Rate and 3-Month Ov ernight Index ed Sw ap rates. 
Monthly  av erage of daily  observ ations.
CDS
Markit Group Limited and Bank of 
England calculations
Unw eighted av erage of the fiv e-y ear CDS premia for the major UK lenders. Monthly  
av erage of daily  observ ations.
FTSE-Vol Bloomberg
FTSE 100 Implied Volatility  Index , 3 months constant maturity . Monthly  av erage of daily  
observ ations.
ImpVol20 Barclay s Liv e
At-the-money  implied v olatility  of 1 y ear LIBOR sw aptions, 20 y ears constant maturity . 
Monthly  av erage of daily  observ ations.
Table A1 - Data description
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Obs Mean Std. Dev . Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev . Min Max
126 2.98 0.40 1.43 4.07 126 2.98 0.29 2.11 3.77
126 3.01 0.30 1.84 4.01 126 2.93 0.29 2.33 3.72
126 2.95 0.27 1.96 3.84 126 2.89 0.31 2.29 3.68
126 2.91 0.25 2.04 3.68 126 2.87 0.33 2.21 3.66
126 2.87 0.24 2.12 3.54 126 2.86 0.35 2.15 3.65
126 2.86 0.24 2.20 3.43 126 2.87 0.37 2.13 3.64
126 2.85 0.24 2.29 3.35 126 2.88 0.37 2.10 3.69
126 2.85 0.24 2.39 3.35 126 1.42 1.67 -3.90 3.10
126 2.86 0.25 2.34 3.36 126 1.54 1.36 -3.10 2.90
126 2.88 0.25 2.31 3.37 126 1.69 1.01 -1.50 2.80
125 0.00 0.26 -0.82 0.58 126 1.81 0.73 -0.70 2.60
126 0.00 0.19 -0.70 0.67 126 1.92 0.52 0.00 2.50
126 0.00 0.15 -0.50 0.56 126 1.99 0.40 0.60 2.50
126 0.00 2.07 -3.01 3.37 126 2.27 1.90 -0.05 5.78
122 0.05 0.16 -0.34 0.43 126 2.78 1.61 0.24 5.56
125 0.00 0.32 -0.97 0.84 126 3.21 1.35 0.80 5.42
113 2.59 0.72 0.80 4.60 126 3.56 1.14 1.35 5.34
126 1.97 0.15 1.52 2.34 126 3.84 0.98 1.83 5.27
110 2.03 0.10 1.78 2.17 126 4.06 0.88 1.98 5.41
113 3.35 0.31 2.62 4.07 126 4.24 0.81 2.11 5.70
126 0.03 0.17 -0.50 0.70 126 4.37 0.77 2.23 5.86
126 2.62 1.04 0.00 5.20 126 4.46 0.74 2.34 5.91
126 -0.98 3.44 -11.10 5.10 126 4.52 0.71 2.45 5.87
126 14.88 35.21 -56.10 86.40 125 2.42 2.02 0.22 5.93
126 -1.07 6.49 -21.60 11.00 125 2.88 1.81 0.28 5.89
126 4.65 8.77 -4.40 19.60 125 3.22 1.61 0.56 5.79
126 2.71 7.27 -17.10 17.60 126 0.34 0.41 0.09 2.21
126 6.04 15.50 -36.2 51.2 126 0.97 0.73 0.06 2.61
126 0.58 0.50 0 1 126 17.59 7.53 8.85 48.68
126 0.16 0.37 0 1 126 -1.42 5.48 -12.93 7.16
Bankrate BoE_cpi_4 BoE_gdp_4 PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate 1
BoE_cpi_4 -0.10 1
BoE_gdp_4 0.17 0.01 1
PF_1y -0.06 0.19 -0.01 1
PF_2y -0.11 0.13 0.06 0.87 1
PF_3y -0.11 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.96 1
PF_4y -0.12 0.06 0.06 0.65 0.90 0.98 1
PF_5y -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.60 0.83 0.93 0.98 1
PF_6y -0.13 0.06 0.02 0.56 0.76 0.86 0.94 0.99 1
PF_7y -0.13 0.06 0.00 0.53 0.69 0.79 0.88 0.95 0.99 1
PF_8y -0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.50 0.63 0.72 0.82 0.91 0.96 0.99 1
PF_9y -0.12 0.07 -0.03 0.48 0.58 0.66 0.77 0.86 0.93 0.97 0.99 1
PF_10y -0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.46 0.54 0.61 0.72 0.82 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.99 1
Table A2 - Descriptive statistics
FG
ZLB
FTSE
Housing
Netlending
Sterling
Oil
Indpro
CPI
RPI surprises
CITI_5y 5
SEF_3y
SEF_2y
CITI_1y
Shadow rate
Bankrate_rob2
Bankrate_rob1
BoE_gdp_4
BoE_cpi_4
Bankrate
PF_10y
PF_9y
PF_8y
PF_7y
PF_6y
Variable
PF_5y
PF_4y
PF_3y
PF_2y
PF_1y
LIBOR-OIS
mc_3y
Variable
CF_gdp_6
CF_gdp_5
CF_gdp_4
CF_gdp_3
CF_gdp_2
CF_gdp_1
PF-G_10y
PF-G_9y
PF-G_8y
PF-G_7y
PF-G_6y
PF-G_5y
PF-G_4y
Correlation structure
ir3m_2y
ir3m_1y
ir3m_7y
ir3m_6y
ir3m_5y
ir3m_4y
ir3m_3y
mc_2y
mc_1y
ir3m_10y
ir3m_9y
ir3m_8y
ImpVol20
FTSE-Vol
CDS
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PF'_1y PF'_2y PF'_3y PF'_4y PF'_5y PF'_6y PF'_7y PF'_8y PF'_9y PF'_10y
Bankrate -0.142 -0.197* -0.211** -0.207** -0.190*** -0.168** -0.144** -0.120** -0.097* -0.077
[0.13] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_cpi_4 0.234 0.111 0.051 0.016 -0.009 -0.023 -0.029 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032
[0.15] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
BoE_gdp_4 0.107 0.155 0.156 0.118 0.07 0.024 -0.018 -0.055 -0.09 -0.12
[0.19] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.627*** 0.578*** 0.588*** 0.630*** 0.671*** 0.704*** 0.729*** 0.744*** 0.750*** 0.749***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Constant 1.119*** 1.170*** 1.095*** 0.979*** 0.881*** 0.808*** 0.762*** 0.740*** 0.740*** 0.757***
[0.27] [0.25] [0.23] [0.21] [0.19] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.79
PF-G_1y PF-G_2y PF-G_3y PF-G_4y PF-G_5y PF-G_6y PF-G_7y PF-G_8y PF-G_9y PF-G_10y
Bankrate . . . -0.123* -0.115* -0.110* -0.102* -0.091 -0.08 -0.072
[0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07]
BoE_cpi_4 . . . 0.132* 0.108 0.088 0.074 0.066 0.061 0.058
[0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08]
BoE_gdp_4 . . . 0.041 0.045 0.026 -0.012 -0.058 -0.106 -0.151
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
Lag dep v ar . . . 0.801*** 0.826*** 0.840*** 0.843*** 0.841*** 0.838*** 0.834***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant . . . 0.582*** 0.550*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 0.556*** 0.576*** 0.598***
[0.17] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt . . . Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N . . . 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² . . . 0.76 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.84
PF''_1y PF''_2y PF''_3y PF''_4y PF''_5y PF''_6y PF''_7y PF''_8y PF''_9y PF''_10y
Bankrate -0.244** -0.219** -0.184** -0.153** -0.121** -0.090** -0.06 -0.032 -0.008 0.013
[0.12] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
BoE_cpi_4 0.243* 0.191** 0.153* 0.120* 0.093* 0.074 0.062 0.053 0.046 0.039
[0.13] [0.10] [0.08] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
BoE_gdp_4 0.207 0.202 0.188* 0.154* 0.111 0.069 0.029 -0.009 -0.043 -0.072
[0.17] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Lag dep v ar 0.736*** 0.739*** 0.765*** 0.795*** 0.825*** 0.849*** 0.866*** 0.878*** 0.886*** 0.893***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
Constant 0.745*** 0.705*** 0.635*** 0.562*** 0.488*** 0.428*** 0.386*** 0.359*** 0.340*** 0.326**
[0.22] [0.20] [0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.85 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96
Table A3 - Robustness checks on the left-hand side variable
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different
horizon and estimated w ith OLS. PF' is the sw ap measure of inflation ex pectations based on the last observ ation in each month
(rather than the av erage of observ ations). PF'' is the inflation compensation measure, so w ithout correction for the risk, liquidity
and inflation risk premia. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate
forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt
includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index and
a dummy  for Forw ard Guidance. 
Last observation
Gilts
Without correction for premia
36 
 
 
  
PF'_1y PF'_2y PF'_3y PF'_4y PF'_5y PF'_6y PF'_7y PF'_8y PF'_9y PF'_10y
Bankrate -0.240* -0.207** -0.180*** -0.159*** -0.143*** -0.129** -0.113** -0.094* -0.075 -0.058
[0.13] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.173 0.160* 0.155** 0.131** 0.103* 0.081 0.07 0.067 0.068 0.067
[0.14] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.209 0.18 0.175* 0.144* 0.099 0.055 0.014 -0.024 -0.057 -0.086
[0.19] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.062 0.211** 0.250*** 0.261*** 0.248*** 0.198** 0.119 0.03 -0.048 -0.102
[0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Constant 0.018 0.014 0.031 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.052 0.063 0.072
[0.15] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
R² 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.21
PF''_1y PF''_2y PF''_3y PF''_4y PF''_5y PF''_6y PF''_7y PF''_8y PF''_9y PF''_10y
Bankrate -0.179 -0.187** -0.177*** -0.162*** -0.143*** -0.125*** -0.106** -0.088* -0.073 -0.061
[0.12] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.224* 0.169* 0.149** 0.130** 0.111* 0.097* 0.089* 0.085 0.081 0.076
[0.13] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.15 0.195* 0.194** 0.160* 0.113 0.067 0.025 -0.014 -0.049 -0.079
[0.17] [0.12] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.666*** 0.733*** 0.776*** 0.796*** 0.804*** 0.803*** 0.796*** 0.784*** 0.771*** 0.758***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant -0.015 -0.03 -0.031 -0.023 -0.012 -0.001 0.01 0.022 0.033 0.044
[0.14] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
CITI_1y SEF_2y SEF_3y CITI_5y 5 CITI_1y SEF_2y SEF_3y CITI_5y 5
Bankrate 0.188 0.035 0.031 0.164* Bankrate 0.211 0.051 0.038* 0.139
[0.15] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08] [0.16] [0.03] [0.02] [0.09]
BoE_cpi_4 0.508*** 0.107*** 0.088*** 0.088 0.301*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.086
[0.15] [0.03] [0.02] [0.09] [0.10] [0.02] [0.01] [0.05]
BoE_gdp_4 0.229 0.011 0.044 0.042 0.12 -0.017 0.017 0.107
[0.21] [0.04] [0.03] [0.12] [0.14] [0.03] [0.02] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.702*** 0.859*** 0.733*** 0.657*** Lag dep v ar 0.637*** 0.824*** 0.675*** 0.621***
[0.07] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.09]
Constant 0.857*** 0.238** 0.475*** 1.111*** Constant 0.983*** 0.288*** 0.580*** 1.225***
[0.20] [0.10] [0.12] [0.28] [0.21] [0.10] [0.12] [0.28]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 109 109 109 109 N 107 107 107 107
R² 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.74 R² 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.74
Table A4 - Robustness checks on the left-hand side variable
First difference
Deviation from target
Survey expectations
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different
horizon and estimated w ith OLS. PF' is the first diffrence in priv ate inflation ex pectations w hile PF'' is the dev iation of inflation
ex pectations from the central bank target adjusted for the CPI-RPI w edge. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate
output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1
and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change
rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index  and a dummy  for Forw ard Guidance. 
BoE_gdp_4_interp
BoE_cpi_4_interp
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PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate -0.196* -0.181** -0.166** -0.161*** -0.154*** -0.143*** -0.130*** -0.114** -0.095* -0.076
[0.11] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.256** 0.192** 0.155** 0.124* 0.100* 0.080 0.063 0.050 0.039 0.031
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.213 0.210* 0.184* 0.144* 0.099 0.055 0.012 -0.027 -0.062 -0.092
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.746*** 0.777*** 0.803*** 0.828*** 0.849*** 0.862*** 0.866*** 0.866*** 0.862*** 0.857***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Constant 0.754*** 0.670*** 0.581*** 0.500*** 0.435*** 0.396*** 0.382*** 0.385*** 0.398*** 0.414***
[0.18] [0.17] [0.16] [0.14] [0.13] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13]
Controls: Xt & Zt No No No No No No No No No No
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.58 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.76
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate -0.137 -0.167* -0.157** -0.140** -0.119** -0.099** -0.079 -0.061 -0.045 -0.033
[0.12] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4_interp 0.173** 0.072 0.055 0.048 0.04 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.015 0.009
[0.08] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
BoE_gdp_4_interp -0.029 -0.003 -0.006 -0.023 -0.044 -0.063 -0.080* -0.094** -0.107** -0.117**
[0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Lag dep v ar 0.612*** 0.711*** 0.761*** 0.786*** 0.797*** 0.798*** 0.791*** 0.779*** 0.766*** 0.754***
[0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 1.060*** 0.784*** 0.643*** 0.580*** 0.559*** 0.568*** 0.598*** 0.641*** 0.689*** 0.735***
[0.25] [0.21] [0.19] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate*Bigshocks 0.143 0.122 0.111 0.102 0.095 0.089 0.087 0.088 0.094 0.104
[0.27] [0.19] [0.15] [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11]
Bankrate -0.274 -0.272* -0.255* -0.234** -0.210** -0.187** -0.167* -0.151 -0.141 -0.137
[0.23] [0.16] [0.13] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
BoE_cpi_4 0.228* 0.170* 0.150** 0.130** 0.112* 0.098* 0.090* 0.086 0.082 0.079
[0.13] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.161 0.208* 0.205** 0.171** 0.124* 0.077 0.035 -0.004 -0.038 -0.067
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.647*** 0.719*** 0.766*** 0.788*** 0.798*** 0.798*** 0.791*** 0.779*** 0.765*** 0.751***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.947*** 0.741*** 0.612*** 0.558*** 0.543*** 0.555*** 0.587*** 0.633*** 0.686*** 0.738***
[0.25] [0.21] [0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.82
Bankrate coefficient w hen:
Dummy  = 1 -0.131 -0.150 -0.144* -0.132** -0.115* -0.098* -0.081 -0.063 -0.047 -0.033
[0.14] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different horizon
and estimated w ith OLS. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate
forecasts, and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt
includes CPI, Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index and a
dummy  for Forw ard Guidance. 
Table A5 - Robustness checks on the right-hand side
No controls
Projection shocks interpolated
Disentangling small and big Bankrate shocks
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PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Shadow  rate -0.144 -0.154** -0.147** -0.134** -0.120** -0.109** -0.098** -0.088** -0.079* -0.07
[0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
BoE_cpi_4 0.219* 0.165* 0.145* 0.126* 0.107* 0.094* 0.085 0.080 0.076 0.071
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.131 0.176 0.175* 0.143* 0.098 0.055 0.015 -0.022 -0.055 -0.083
[0.17] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.669*** 0.735*** 0.772*** 0.790*** 0.798*** 0.798*** 0.792*** 0.781*** 0.768*** 0.755***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.892*** 0.693*** 0.590*** 0.550*** 0.540*** 0.552*** 0.583*** 0.627*** 0.677*** 0.725***
[0.24] [0.21] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate_rob1 0.015 -0.052 -0.070** -0.074** -0.068** -0.058** -0.046* -0.035 -0.025 -0.016
[0.06] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
BoE_cpi_4 0.248* 0.198** 0.180** 0.163** 0.142** 0.124** 0.111** 0.102* 0.094* 0.086
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.112 0.149 0.149 0.121 0.079 0.038 0.000 -0.035 -0.067 -0.094
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Lag dep v ar 0.655*** 0.739*** 0.800*** 0.831*** 0.840*** 0.835*** 0.821*** 0.803*** 0.784*** 0.766***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
Constant 0.930*** 0.588** 0.398* 0.320* 0.319* 0.362** 0.430*** 0.509*** 0.589*** 0.662***
[0.27] [0.23] [0.20] [0.18] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.17]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R² 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.82
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate_rob2 -0.838** -0.492** -0.308 -0.27 -0.253 -0.227 -0.186 -0.134 -0.081 -0.035
[0.36] [0.25] [0.21] [0.18] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
BoE_cpi_4 0.257** 0.195** 0.171** 0.150** 0.129** 0.113** 0.102* 0.095* 0.09 0.084
[0.13] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
BoE_gdp_4 0.134 0.166 0.164 0.142 0.107 0.067 0.025 -0.015 -0.054 -0.088
[0.17] [0.12] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
Lag dep v ar 0.648*** 0.728*** 0.775*** 0.798*** 0.808*** 0.807*** 0.799*** 0.787*** 0.773*** 0.760***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Constant 0.913*** 0.682*** 0.554*** 0.497*** 0.483*** 0.499*** 0.538*** 0.589*** 0.643*** 0.696***
[0.24] [0.21] [0.19] [0.17] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
R² 0.64 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.81
PF_1y PF_2y PF_3y PF_4y PF_5y PF_6y PF_7y PF_8y PF_9y PF_10y
Bankrate -0.151 -0.177 -0.17 -0.173* -0.180* -0.177** -0.157* -0.122 -0.08 -0.038
[0.21] [0.14] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
BoE_cpi_4 0.843** 0.669** 0.531** 0.429** 0.337** 0.266* 0.228 0.222 0.238 0.261
[0.40] [0.26] [0.22] [0.19] [0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.15] [0.16] [0.16]
BoE_gdp_4 0.535 0.552* 0.493** 0.420** 0.340** 0.265* 0.198 0.147 0.115 0.097
[0.43] [0.28] [0.23] [0.19] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15]
Lag dep v ar 0.578*** 0.709*** 0.771*** 0.822*** 0.847*** 0.829*** 0.759*** 0.649*** 0.525*** 0.414**
[0.15] [0.15] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17]
Constant 0.962 0.498 0.395 0.26 0.133 0.093 0.166 0.319 0.499 0.657
[0.77] [0.60] [0.56] [0.53] [0.49] [0.46] [0.44] [0.45] [0.45] [0.46]
Controls: Xt & Zt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R² 0.69 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.74
Table A6 - Robustness checks on the identification of monetary shocks
Shadow rate
Taylor rule identification
Cloyne and Huertgen (2014)'s identification
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to equation (11) for a different horizon and
estimated w ith OLS. Xt includes the change betw een t-1 and t in priv ate output forecasts and in priv ate 3-month interest rate forecasts,
and a new s v ariable capturing the information flow betw een t-1 and t of macro data releases related to inflation. Zt includes CPI,
Industrial production, Oil prices, Sterling effectiv e ex change rate, Net lending, Housing prices, the FTSE index  and a dummy  for FG. 
Sub-sample ending in March 2009
